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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BONNIE LOFFREDO and DONALD A.
WESTENSKOW,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
vs.
Case No. 20000170
SCOTT W. HOLT,
Defendant/Appellant.

The Appellant, Scott Holt, pursuant to Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal
Brief.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(1953), as amended.

The order

appealed from is a final order disposing of all claims of
the parties.

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Was the Defendant entitled to payment of attorney's
fees by Plaintiff Westenskow without an express
written contingent fee agreement?
2. Did the Defendant fail to file an affidavit of
attorney's fees in a timely manner and was the trial
court correct in then denying him an award of
attorney's fees against Plaintiff Westenskow?
3. Is Defendant entitled to attorney's fees and costs as
against Loffredo, under the written fee agreement
with Loffredo, for prevailing on Loffredo's claims
against Defendant?
4. Was the trial court's award of pre-judgment interest
in favor of Plaintiff/Appellant Westenskow
appropriate?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment by the
trial court is appropriate only when there are no issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Utah R., Civ. P. 56(c), Higgins v.

County, 855 P.2d 235 (Utah 1984).

In reviewing a grant of

summary judgment, the Court views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
2

E.g., Smith v.

Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992);
Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991);

Rollins v.
Utah State

Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 776
P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989).
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness, granting them no
deference.

Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989);

White v. Desselhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994).

On

appeal, the Supreme Court determines only whether the trial
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the
"trial court correctly held that there were no disputed
issues of material fact".

Id.

In reviewing the trial

court's decision, the Supreme Court views the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and will find
summary judgment proper only when there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
56(c).

Utah Rules of Civ. P.

Drysdale v. Ford Motor Company, 947 P.2d 678, 680

(Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
A. Rules of Professional Conduct: In making its
determination, the trial court referred to Rule 1.5 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.

3

B. Utah Case Law:

In making its determination, the

trial court referred to the Utah Supreme Court decision in
Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1989).

That

case held that, for a statutory attorney's lien to arise
between the parties, the contingent fee agreement must be
in writing; and that, if the terms of the agreement do not
reflect, in writing, what effect a termination of the
agreement would have on the fees of the attorney, then
there does not exist a statutory lien.

Archuleta v.

Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998) held that Rule 1.5 of the
Rules of Professional Responsibility does not provide a
basis for civil liability against attorneys.
Bullock v. State Department of Transportation, 966
P.2d 1215 (Utah App. 1998), Westinghouse Credit Corp. v.
Hyrdoswift Corp., 528 P.2d 156 (Utah 1974), and Lowe v.
April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974) are cases
which hold that a party may, by its actions, ratify a
contract.
C. Statutes: The primary statutory provision governing
attorney's fee liens is U.C.A. §78-51-41 (1953), as amended.
The primary statutory provision governing the award of
interest in legal claims is U.C.A §15-1-1 (1953), as amended.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case
This appeal is from a final order of the First
Judicial District Court, Hon. Thomas L. Willmore, which
partially granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
and partially granted Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2. Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff/Appellee Westenskow filed a Complaint
against Defendant/Appellant, claiming that Appellee
Westenskow did not have a written contingent fee agreement
with Defendant/Appellant and, therefore, did not owe
Appellant an attorney's fee upon settlement of a wrongful
death claim.

Plaintiff/Appellee Loffredo filed a complaint

against the Defendant/Appellant in which she claimed that
Defendant knowingly misrepresented the terms of the written
contingent fee agreement that she had entered into with the
Defendant and that Defendant should receive a contingent
fee of only 25% instead of the 33% Defendant claimed.

Both

Plaintiffs sought a return from Defendant of a total of
$45,000.00 which Defendant had retained from the settlement
of Plaintiff's claims as attorney's fees.

The Defendant

/Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the
court to rule that Loffredo owed him an attorney's fee
5

arising for the settlement of the wrongful death action and
attorney's fees and costs arising out of his action to
enforce the contingent fee agreement and defending against
Loffredo's claim against Defendant.
3. Disposition in Lower Court
The trial court granted Plaintiff/Appellee
Westenskow's Motion for Summary Judgment, but denied
Plaintiff/Appellee Loffredo's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, but did not rule whether or not Loffredo owed
Defendant/Appellant attorney's fees as set forth in the
contingent fee agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Heidi Westenskow was killed in an automobile accident
on May 27, 1994.

Heidi was the daughter of both

Plaintiffs in this action.
2. Plaintiff Loffredo retained Defendant to represent
her interests in a wrongful death action arising from
an automobile accident involving Heidi, and signed a
contingent fee agreement with Defendant. (Attached as
Exhibit "A", hereto). (Record on Appeal, hereinafter
"R". 301-304)
3. In that contingent fee agreement, both Plaintiff
Loffredo and Defendant agreed that "In the event
6

legal proceedings are necessary to enforce the terms
of this agreement, the defaulting party agrees to pay
a reasonable attorney fee plus costs of court."
4. Plaintiff Westenskow retained another attorney,
Robert L. Neeley, to represent his interests arising
from that same automobile accident. (R. 3 01-304)
5. During a meeting in November, 1994 at Neeley's
office, it was agreed that Westenskow and Loffredo
would split any recovery, after costs and attorney's
fees, with Loffredo receiving 70% and Westenskow
receiving 30%. (R. 301-304)
6. It was also agreed during that meeting that Defendant
would represent Westenskow and that Westenskow would
pay Defendant a contingent fee on the same terms as
the written fee agreement that Defendant had with
Loffredo. (R. 301-304)
7. Any and all potential conflicts between Defendant and
Plaintiffs as a result of Defendant's representation
of both Plaintiffs were openly discussed and
resolved, with the Plaintiffs agreeing to have
Defendant represent them both.
8. Defendant sent a letter to Neeley confirming the oral
agreement reached in Neeley's office and sent a

7

written fee agreement to Neeley for Westenskow"s
signature.
9. Westenskow did receive the written contingent fee
agreement.
10.

(R. 3 01-304)

Defendant did not receive the signed fee agreement
back from Neeley, but assumed that Westenskow had
signed the agreement.

11.

On January 27, 1995, Farmer's Insurance Exchange
filed a complaint on its own behalf, naming
Loffredo and Westenskow as defendants.

12.

The claims brought in the Farmer's Insurance
Exchange action were successfully settled in favor
of the Plaintiffs through the efforts of Defendant
on April 28, 1995.

13.

On three separate occasions after the settlement of
the claim Westenskow signed a Settlement Statement
in which he acknowledged that he was paying a onethird contingent fee to Defendant and in which he
acknowledged and reitified his retainer agreement
with Defendant.

(Exhibits "B",

U

C" and "D",

attached hereto). (R. 301-304)
14.

Both Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant,
claiming that they did not owe a fee to Defendant

8

and seeking return of the fees held by Defendant.
(R. 001-008)
The trial court ruled that the written fee
agreement that Defendant had with Loffredo was
valid but that, because Defendant did not have a
written fee agreement with Westenskow, Westenskow
did not owe Defendant a fee. (R. 301-304)
The trial court held, however, that Westenskow owed
Defendant a reasonable attorney's fee, apparently
on a quantum meruit theory, and ordered Defendant
to file an accounting of time and costs within
twenty (20) days of the entry of the Memorandum
Decision on June 29, 1999. (R. 301-304)
The Plaintiffs filed a proposed Order and Judgment
on August 19, 1999.
The trial court signed the Order and Judgment on
September 1, 1999 (R. 309-311).
That Order and Judgment was objected to by
Defendant on September 2, 1999. (R. 312-313)
On October 18, 1999 Defendant filed his accounting
of time and costs with the court.
There was a hearing on Defendant's Objections on
October 26, 1999. (R. 344)
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22.

Plaintiff Westenskow objected to Defendant's
accounting of time and costs as not having been
timely filed with the trial court.

23.

The trial court held that, because the Defendant's
accounting of time and costs was not timely filed
under the trial court's Memorandum Decision of June
29, 1999, Westenskow owed nothing to Defendant for
any time expended on behalf of Westenskow. (R. 354357)

24. The trial court also did not award attorney's fees
or costs against Loffredo in favor of Defendant,
even though the written fee agreement between
Loffredo and Defendant provided for attorney's fees
and costs to the prevailing party in event of a
dispute.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment should be granted only when the
evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, demonstrates that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The grounds considered by the court in granting the
Plaintiffs/Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment in this
case are that 1) Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional
10

Conduct require that a contingent fee agreement be in
writing, which agreement was not reduced in writing as it
applied to Plaintiff Westenskow; and, 2) the
Defendant/Appellant's accounting of fees and costs was not
timely filed by the Defendant/Appellant and that he should
not be awarded any fees as against Westenskow.
Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not
set forth a standard for civil liability, as the trial
court attempts to do.

Additionally, the contingent fee

agreement was in writing (although not signed by
Westenskow), which is all that is required by Rule 1.5.
Further, the ratification by the Plaintiffs of the
oral agreement between the parties (by their signatures on
the Closing Settlement Statements) was enough to justify
paying a contingent fee to Defendant.
Defendant did not file his affidavit of attorney's
fees because he was relying upon the fact that he believed
that he was in settlement negotiations with the attorney
for the Plaintiffs, which would preclude the necessity of
the filing of the affidavit.
Finally, the trial court failed to order any
attorney's fees or costs in favor of the Defendant,
although such fees and costs are allowed in the written,

11

signed fee agreement between Loffredo and Defendant and
Defendant prevailed in the action against Loffredo.
ARGUMENT
I
THE ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN WESTENSKOW
AND DEFENDANT WAS ENFORCEABLE
AND DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A
CONTINGENT FEE EVEN ABSENT A
WRITTEN AGREEMENT
A)

The Rules of Professional Responsibility are not
a basis for civil liability of an attorney.

The Plaintiffs met with their respective attorneys in
November, 1994 in an attempt to resolve the question of
which party would get what amount from any settlement of
their wrongful death action which arose from the death of
their daughter.

An agreement between the parties was

reached (Loffredo agreeing to receive a 70% share and
Westenskow a 3 0% share, and with Defendant representing
both Plaintiffs thereafter).

The agreement between the

Plaintiffs and their agreement to have Defendant represent
them was memorialized in a letter written by Defendant cind
sent to Robert Neeley, Westenskow's attorney.

In that

letter was enclosed a contingent fee retainer agreement for
Westenskow to execute.

That contingent fee retainer

agreement also included provisions whereby Westenskow would
agree to pay a contingent fee to Plaintiff.
12

Several months later, on April 25, 1995, the court
case between the Plaintiffs and Farmer's Insurance Exchange
was settled favorably for Plaintiffs.

On October 9 and

again on October 25, 1995, Plaintiffs each signed a
"Closing Settlement Statement".

Each statement settled

their claims against the insurance companies involved in
this matter, acknowledged their fee agreement with
Defendant and agreed with the Defendant's accounting of
funds from the settlement, including the payment of
Defendant's attorney's fees and costs.

A third Closing

Settlement Statement was signed by the Plaintiffs, but is
not dated.
In their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment the Plaintiffs relied chiefly upon the
language of Rule 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility as their basis for the claim that Defendant
was not entitled to a contingent fee from Westenskow.
Rules 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility states:
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter for which the service is rendered, except
in a matter in which a contingent fee is
prohibited
by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee
shall be in writing and shall state the method by
which the fee is to be determined, including the
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to
13

the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or
appeal, litigation and other expenses to be
deducted from the recovery and whether such
expenses are to be deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion
of a contingent'fee matter, the lawyer shall
provide the client with a written statement
stating the outcome of the matter and, if there
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the
client and the method of its determination.
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision dated June
29, 1999, relied solely upon the language of Rule 1.5(c) of
the Rules of Professional Responsibility in holding that
the Defendant was not entitled to a contingent fee from
Westenskow.
In the case of Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah
1998) , a legal malpractice case, the Supreme Court stated
that:
We agree with the court of appeals, and conclude
that the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct are
not designed to create a basis for civil
liability.
The Rules of Professional Responsibility themselves
agree with the conclusion of the Utah Supreme Court.
The Rules of Professional Responsibility, under the
section entitled "Scope", state:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a
cause of action, nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been breached.
The Rules are designed to provide guidance to
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are
14

not designed to be a basis for civil liability.
Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be
subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that
a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's selfassessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under the
administration of a disciplinary authority does
not imply that an antagonist in a collateral
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek
enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in
the Rule should be deemed to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extradisciplinary consequences of violating such a
duty. (Emphasis added)
Other jurisdictions have followed the admonition of
the Rules and have refused to allow the Rules to be a basis
for civil liability against an attorney.
The Rules are not designed for a basis for civil
liability, but are to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulatory conduct
through disciplinary agencies. No cause of
action should arise from a violation, nor should
it create any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached.
Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc.. 833 S.W. 2d 366
(Ark. 1992) .

The Washington Court of Appeals in Harrington

v. Pailthorp. 841 P.2d 1258 (Wash.App.Div.1 1992) held
that:
[A]n attorney's violat ion of RPC provisions does
not give rise to an independent cause of action
against an attorney. . . Even if Harrington could
show Pailthorp violated any RPC's, he would have
no claim against her solely on that basis.
(Emphasis added)

15

B)

Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
does not require that the written contingent fee
agreement be signed by the parties.

Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states
only that:
A contingent fee shall be in writing
state the method by which the fee is
determined, including the percentage
percentages that shall accrue to the
the event of settlement . . .

and shall
to be
or
lawyer in

There is no requirement under Rule 1.5 that the
contingent fee agreement be signed by any of the parties.
The Memorandum Decision entered by the trial court in this
case states:
Westenskow entered the matter at a later date and
did not sign such an agreement, though it appears
he received a copy of the agreement which he was
supposed to sign. (R. 301-304)
In this case, the contingent fee agreement was in
writing and was supplied to Westenskow, although not signed
by the parties, and was ratified by Westenskow.
C) An oral contract can be ratified by the actions or
statements of a party and can be enforceable.
In this case, the parties agreed during a meeting
between them and their respective counsel that:
1) Defendant would represent both Plaintiffs;
2) That the Plaintiffs would split any settlement
between them on the basis of 70% for Loffredo
and 3 0% for Westenskow; and

16

3) That Defendant would be entitled to a
contingent fee from Westenskow on the same
basis as that contained in his written
contingent fee agreement with Loffredo.

That

is, a contingent fee of 25% prior to filing of
suit and 33.33% thereafter.
4) That Defendant would send a written contingent
fee agreement to Westenskow's then attorney
and that Westenskow would execute that
agreement. (R. 3 01-3 04)
Defendant sent a written contingent fee agreement to
Westenskow, but Westenskow never signed the fee agreement.
(R. 3 01-304)

However, on three separate occasions,

Westenskow did sign a document entitled "Closing Settlement
Statement", wherein it was disclosed to him that his claim
had settled for a certain amount, that certain expenses
were being paid out of that settlement and that a
contingent fee was being paid to Defendant.
and Exhibits

U

(R. 3 01-3 04

B" through U D", attached hereto).

Those "Closing Settlement Statements" also contained
the following paragraph, over the signatures of both
Loffredo and Westenskow:
COMES NOW the undersigned who hereby acknowledge
that they have reviewed the Closing Settlement
Statement and find that it is in accordance with the
17

terms and conditions of the retainer agreement with
their Attorney, Scott W. Holt. They further
acknowledge they authorized said attorney to accept
said sums as settlement in full for their wrongful
death claim re: Heidi Westenskow and acknowledge
receipt of a check for the full amount due each
client. (Emphasis added)
In the case of Bullock v. State Department of
Transportation, 966 P.2d 1215 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that:
Any conduct which indicates assent . . . which is
justifiable only if there is ratification is
sufficient [to ratify a contract]. Even silence
with full knowledge of the facts may manifest
affirmance and thus operate as a ratification . .
. (Emphasis added) Id. at 1219.
In the case of Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hyrdoswift
Corp., 528 P.2d 156 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court
held that:
There is also a well recognized rule that a
corporation may not represent to another party
that it has executed a valid contract, induce
the other to perform, accept the benefits, and
then when it suits its interest, renege and
escape the burdens of the contract. By so
engaging in the business and enjoying its
advantages the corporation is deemed to ratify
the contract, wherefore, it cannot then repudiate
and avoid its obligations. (Emphasis added)
id. at 157
Although obviously not corporations, the general rule
set forth above applies equally to private individuals such
as the Plaintiffs in this case.

While a written contract

between Westenskow and Defendant was never executed, an
18

oral agreement was certainly entered into between them.
(R. 301-304)
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
"Implied [ratification may arise] under circumstances of
acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not promptly
exercise."
(Utah 1974).

Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297
In this case, the Plaintiffs orally agreed to

have Defendant jointly represent them in their wrongful
death claim; then, upon settlement of the claim, and in
writing, agreed with the settlement and the disbursement of
the monies from the settlement, including Defendant's
contingent fee; and then, without making complaint, cashed
their checks from the Defendant.

It wasn't until some

three months after they signed the "Closing Settlement
Agreement" that some "buyer's remorse" occurred and they
wanted to abrogate the agreement with Defendant.
Westenskow ratified the oral contingent fee agreement
that he had with the Defendant and he should be held to
that agreement.
II
DID THE DEFENDANT FAIL TO TIMELY FILE
AN AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH
WOULD PRECLUDE HIM FROM AN AWARD OF FEES?
On June 30, 1999, the trial court issued a Memorandum
Decision (R. 301-304) in which it ruled partly in favor of
19

Plaintiffs and partly in favor of Defendant.

In that

Memorandum Decision, the trial court ordered the Defendant
to file an affidavit of attorney's fees and costs within
twenty (20) days of the date that the decision was issued.
It wasn't until August 19, 1999 that the attorney for
Plaintiffs got around to filing an Order and Judgment based
on the Memorandum Decision of the trial court.

Defendant

filed an Objection to the Order and Judgment filed by
Plaintiffs on September 2, 1999.
During the period of time from June 30, 1999 until the
Defendant filed his Affidavit of Fees and Costs on October
18, 1999, Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant were in
settlement negotiations, attempting to resolve this matter.
Settlement negotiations continued until Defendant left for
a trip out of the country on August 3, 1999.

On August 19,

1999, while Defendant was out of the country (and
Plaintiff's counsel was aware of Defendant's absence), the
Order and Judgment was filed.
Defendant assumed that during such negotiations he
would not be required to file his affidavit of fees and
costs, which would only serve to further inflate those
fees.

Defendant believed that he could rely on statements

by Plaintiff's counsel that he was going to talk with his
clients and get back to Defendant and that a filing of
20

Defendant's Affidavit of Fees and Costs would not be
required until the settlement negotiations broke down.
Ill
UNDER THE WRITTEN FEE AGREEMENT WITH
LOFFREDO, THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS UPON PREVAILING
ON LOFFREDO'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT
In the written fee agreement between Loffredo and
Defendant, the parties agree that:
In the event legal proceedings are necessary to
enforce the terms of this agreement, the defaulting
party agrees to pay a reasonable attorney fee
plus costs of court.
Loffredo brought suit against Defendant, claiming that
she did not owe him an attorney's fee under the contingent
fee agreement.

The trial court held against Loffredo and

held that she did, under the terms of the written contingent
fee agreement, owe Defendant an attorney's fee.
Clearly, Defendant prevailed on that issue.

Under the

express written terms of the fee agreement, he is entitled to
attorney's fees and costs against Loffredo.

"If provided for

by contract, attorney fees are awarded in accordance with the
terms of that contract."

Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah.Ct.App.1993). Where a
contract provides the "right to attorney fees, Utah courts
have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or
defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to
21

those claims on which the party was successful."
Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings v. Mehrr 791 P.2d 217,
221 (Utah Ct.App.1990).

The trial court erred in failing to

award Defendant attorney's fees and costs against Loffredo.
IV
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN AWARDED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF WESTENSKOW
The trial court held that pre-judgment interest should
be awarded to the Plaintiff on the amounts of the contingent
fee that Defendant owes Westenskow.

The trial court relied

on the cases of Fitzgerald v. Crutchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304
(Utah App. 1987) and Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 801 (Utah
1979).

However, those cases both dealt with claims based on

contracts.
In this case, the trial court found that there was not a
written fee agreement between Westenskow and Defendant.
Absent such a "contract", pre-judgment interest is not
appropriate.

U.C.A. §15-1-1 (1953), as amended, provides for

pre-judgment interest only in cases where the interest is
provided for in the contract.

There are no other statutory

provisions which support the trial court's conclusion that an
award of pre-judgment interest was appropriate in this case.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court found that there was an agreement
between Westenskow and Defendant, but that the contingent fee
agreement between them was not in writing.

Using Rule 1.5 of

the Rules of Professional Conduct as its basis, the trial
court found that Westenskow did not owe a contingent fee to
Defendant.

The trial court erred in that conclusion because

1) the trial court should not have relied solely on Rule 1.5
of the Rules of Professional Conduct; 2) there was a written
contingent fee agreement between Westenskow and Defendant,
albeit not signed; and 3) there was an oral agreement
allowing for a contingent fee between Westenskow and
Defendant, which Westenskow ratified three times in writing.
The trial court erred in denying Defendant's Affidavit
of Attorney's Fees.

The Defendant was in negotiations with

the Plaintiffs regarding this matter and believed, rightly,
that an affidavit was not necessary at that time.

In any

event, the trial court erred in denying completely any
attorney's fees for Defendant based solely on his inadvertent
failure to file an attorney's fee affidavit within a time
limit set by the court.
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to award
attorney's fees in favor of the Defendant against Plaintiff
Loffredo when Defendant prevailed in the action brought by
23

Loffredo.

The written, signed contingent fee agreement

between Loffredo and Defendant clearly provided that the
prevailing party would be awarded attorney's fees and
costs.

The trial court should have awarded those fees and

costs against Loffredo.
DATED this /(WL

day of August, 2000.

NEIL B. CRIST & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

By: X / ^ ^ ^
(_LjEOltfARD E . McGEE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was sent, via First Class
U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following counsel of
record, this /dfrL
day of August, 2 000:
Scott Waterfall
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellees
4605 Harrison Blvd., Third Floor
Ogden, Utah 84403

C^ 1 ^
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

Retainer Agreement

EXHIBIT B

Closing Settlement Statement (First)

EXHIBIT C

Closing Settlement Statement (Second)

EXHIBIT D

Closing Settlement Statement (Third)

EXHIBIT E

Memorandum Decision (June 29, 1999)
Order and Judgment (January 26, 2000)
Memorandum Decision (December 15, 1999)

EXHIBIT F

Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5

RETAINER
This Agreement made this

—

*/

•

AGREEMENT
*

^

day of

W\ **^f

. 1 9 ? * . by
and between
Go^'-*^
UoCf^^-<L
who resides
at
, hereinafter
referred to as CLIENT and SCOTT W. HObT. hereinafter referred to as ATTORNEY.
Client

-gi*~i »qH

retains Attorney in the following
^ ^

mattcr(s):

, c l ^ L

>*-C

-J^A^UA,,!:

- ^

and empowers him to do all things and tc effect a compromise in said matter, or
to institute such legal action as may be advisable in his judgment and agrees to
pay for his services:
a.
y^S
percent of the amount recovered -with—&- without
suit."*"" In the event of appeal, an additional agreement for services shall be
made by the parties.
forthwith and the balance of S

Costs and necessary disbursements arc to be advanced
hearing, or trial.

by client, prior to

Client agrees to make no settlement with the opposing party except in
the presence of the Attorney; any settlement so obtained shall be subject to the
terms of this agreement.
Client agrees thai he will not substitute Attorneys without the consent
of the Attorney: substitutions in violation hereof shall entitled the Attorney to
full fee set fonh above.
It is agreed that Attorney has made no
successful termination of the cause of action.

representations

regarding

the

In the event legal proceedings; arc necessary to enforce the terms of
this agreement the defaulting party agrees to pay a reasonable attorney fee
plus costs of Court.

4>

ACCEPTED-

CLIENT
ATTORNEY

6

CLIENT

AA_L ^
f> ~T

cc~. -iv s *•->*-

yCl—-~_^c-^.-

C

•

^

~r~^

USAA

Undcrinsured

coverage

settlement

Less Attorney's fees as per Retainer Agreement (3

1/3

Subtotal:

23.333.33

Less Costs and Expenses in arrears

-0-

NET SETTLEMENT TO BONNIE LOFFREDO

S

16,333.33

NET SETTLEMENT TO DONALD WESTENSKOW

5

7,000,00,,

BALANCE REMAINING:

<b*^
- ^

-0AC<NOWLEDGMENT

COMES NOW* the undersigned who hereby acknowledge that they have
reviewed the Closing Settlement Statement and find that it is in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the re:ainer agreement with their Attorney.
Scott W. Holt. They further acknowledge they authorized said at:omey to
accept said sums as settlement in full for their wrongful death claim re: Heidi
Westenskcw and acknowledge receipt of a check for the ful! amount cue each
ciienc.
<£^U0
^
'oa
199:
DA i ED this
aav ot
,/XI^, - s

-SONME LOFFREDO /

/

DONALD WESTENSKOW

EXHIBIT B

L e s s Attorney's fees as per Retainer Agreement @

1/3

16.666.67

Subtotal:

Less

Cosis

y r

33.333.33

incurred:
Certification
Remaining

fee

of

urn

Judgment

Balance:-

NET SETTLEMENT TO BONNIE L0FFR5DO
NET SETTLEMENT TO DONALD W5STENSKOW

5

33.328.33

S

23,322.33

S

9,995.50

BALANCE REMAINING:

"&°

•0ACKNOWLEDGMENT

COMES NOW the undersigned who hereby acknowledge that they have
reviewed the Closing Settlement Statement and find that it is in accordance
with the icr^ns and conditions of the retainer agreement with their Attorney,
Scott W. Holt. They further ac:<no wledge they authorized said attorney to
accept said sums as settlement in full :cr their wrongful death claim re: Held:
Wescenskow and acknowledge receioc of a check: for ihc lull amount cue each
r ' i » n f

D A i ED this

S2>
-BONNE L O F F R E D O ^

S/J^/^jfaZZofe
WESTENSKOW

y_

DOTHALD

EXHIBIT C

^

^

POLICY LIMITS FROM STATE FARM:

S

50.000.00

sLess Atiorncy's fees as per Retainer Agreement <2> 1/3

/

Subtotal:

Less

Funerai Expenses (Previously
to Chapel of Flowers):

paid

^>^

16.666^ J J

S

33,333.34

£

3.000.00

s

30.333.34

Reimbursement to Bonnie Loffredo for out of pocket
and non-reimbursed expenses re: Keidi

- 3.35^ 10

Total Net Settlement:

(Plus

J^.

directly

Subtotal:

To Bonnie

"'

Loffredo

s

26.979.24

s

IS. 8Z5A6
3.35-i.iO '

reimbursement)

s

Total:

s

To Donald Wescenskcw

nn

^ ^ />

c

^ &*&

8.993.77 _<)0

AGCNCWL
COMES NOW the undersigned and acknowledge that they have reviewed
the closing statement and fine that i: is in accordance with the terms of me
re:a:ner agreement. That they runner acknowledge they authorized SCOTT \v\
KOLT to disburse tie proceeds pursuant to the Closicg Staiement.
Further, that
they acknowledge receipt of a check for the furl amount due each client.
They
also understands that if there are any additional medicai expenses which have
not been paid to date that any said amounts would be paid from tne ne:
proceeds and they would be responsible to pay chem.

BONNIE LOFFREDO

DONALD WESTENSKOW

EXHIBIT D

/

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BONNIE LOFFREDO and DONALD
A. WESTENSKOW,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOTT W.HOLT
Defendant

|

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[|
|
]
'

Case No. 980100068
Judge Thomas L, Wfflmore

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs* and Defendant's separate motions for
summary judgment Plaintiffs and Defendant eachfiledin response to said motions and on May
25,1999, the court heard oral argument. Having considered the matter, the Court now issues this
Memorandum Decision,
On May 31,1994, Bonnie Lof&edo (Loffredo) executed a contingent fee agreement
securing Defendant's services in a wrongful death action which arose when her daughter was
killed in an automobile accident The agreement provided that Defendant would receive 25% of
any recovery or 33 1/3% "if suit is filed."
On November 8,1994, Defendant and Lof&edo attended a meeting in attorney Robert
Neeley's office to discuss an apportionment of recovery with the decedent's father, Donald A.
Westenskow (Westenskow). At the time, Robert Neeley represented Westenskow and Defendant
represented Lof&edo.
During the meeting, it was agreed that Westenskow would receive 30% of any recovery
and Defendant would receive 70%. It was also agreed that Defendant would represent both
1

parties and that Westenskow would sign a contingent fee retainer agreement with Defendant
identical to the Loffredo agreement. In the end, Westenskow Med to sign the agreement
In January of 1995, Fanners Insurance Exchange filed a declaratory action naming
Loffredo and Westenskow as defendants. Farmers Insurance Exchange was one of three
insurance companies potentially providing coverage for the accident at issue. Eventually, the
three insurance companies settled with Plaintifis and tendered payment via three separate checks
totaling $135,000. As each check was received, Defendant withdrew 33 1/3% and apportioned
the remaining sum 70/30 as per the parties agreement. Loffredo and Westenskow signed three
separate settlement statements over the course of several weeks that noted Defendant's
withholding of 33 1/3% as fees.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges Defendant wrongfully withheld feesfromthe settlement in
that he was not entitled to 33 1/3% of the recovery*
Rule L5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conductrequirescontingent fee agreements to be
written, Loffredo signed the agreement provided by Defendant prior to the representation.
Westenskow entered the matter at a later date and did not sign such an agreement, though it
appears he received a copy of the agreement which he was supposed to sign.
The Court has considered thefilings,affidavits, and arguments set forth by the parties,
andfindsthat no issues of disputed material feet exist and judgment may issue as a matter of law.
The Court finds that plaintiff Bonnie Loffredo is bound by the contingent fee agreement
Farmers insurance Exchange filed suit and Defendant represented Plaintiffs in that matter.
Therefore, Defendant is entitled to 33 1/3% of die recoveryfromBonnie Loffredo, sums already
retained by Defendant.
Plaintiff Westenskow, however, did not sign the contingent fee agreement The Court
finds that since Westenskow did not sign the contingent fee agreement, he is not subject to its
terms. Phillips v. Smithu 768 P.2d 449,451 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, Defendant provided
2

services on behalf of Westenskow, from which Westenskow benefitted. Plaintiff Westenskow
will be liable to Defendant for a reasonable fee for services rendered. Therefore, the Court orders
defendant to submit an accounting of time and costs expected on behalf of Westenskow within
20 days from the date of this Memorandum Decision- If Westenskow objects to any portion of
Defendant's accounting then Westenskow must file his objections with the Court within 14 days
from receipt of Defendant's accounting. The Court will review any objections by Westenskow.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are
denied in part and granted in part as provided herein.
This Memorandum Decision issues Mscrj

day of June, 1999.
/.

Thomas Willmorc
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for case
980100068 by the method and on the date specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

Scott W. Holt
44 North Main Street
LaytonUT 84041

Mail

R Scott Waterfall
4605 South Harrison BlvA Suite 300
Ogden UT 84403

Dated this

30

of _ j J u n ^

, 1999.

Deputy Court Clerk

.

. , r»-»*

R. SCOTT WATERFALL #3680
CATHERINE F. LABATTE #6763
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
Attorneys for Petitioners
4605 Harrison Boulevard, Third Floor
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone (801) 479-4777
Facsimile (801) 479-4804
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BONNIE LOFFREDO and
DONALD A. WESTENSKOW,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Civil No. 980100068CN
SCOTT W. HOLT,
Defendant.

Judge Thomas L. Willmore

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiffs' and Defendant's separate motions
for summary judgment. Plaintiffs and Defendant each filed responses to said motions and on
May 25, 1999 the Court heard oral argument. Plaintiffs were present and represented by counsel,
R. Scott Waterfall. Defendant was present, acting pro se. The Court entered its Memorandum
Decision on June 29,1999.
On August 17, 1999, Plaintiffs submitted an Order and Judgement based on this
Memorandum Decision to which Defendant objected.
A further hearing on this matter and Defendant's Objection to Order was held came
before the Coun on October 20. 1999. The Court heard oral argument from Plaintiff*' m.m^l

R. Scott Waterfall, and Defendant Scott W. Holt, acting pro se. The court entered its
Memorandum Decision on December 15, 1999. Based upon its June 29, 1999 and December
15, 1999, Memorandum Decisions the Court makes and enters the following Order and
Judgment:
1. Plaintiff Bonnie Loffredo entered a written contingent attorney fee agreement with
Defendant Holt and is bound by its terms. Farmers Insurance Exchange filed suit and Defendant
represented Plaintiff Loffredo in that matter concerning the wrongful death of Plaintiff s
daughter, Heidi Westenskow. Therefore, Plaintiff Loffredo's claim for return a portion of the
attorneys fees is denied.
2. Plaintiff Donald A. Westenskow did not sign a contingent attorney fee agreement
with Defendant. Therefore, Defendant Holt is not entitled to a contingent attorneys fee.
Defendant was ordered to submit to the Court a claim for reasonable attorney fees for services
rendered no later than twenty (20) days from the Memorandum Decision dated June 29, 1999
(July 19, 1999).
3. Defendant Holt failed to submit his time accounting in a timely manner and the
Court will not allow Defendant's late filing. Further, Defendant Holt did not keep accurate time
records. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to attorney fees incurred on behalf of Plaintiff
Westenskow.

4. Defendant Scott W. Holt is ordered to pay plaintiff Donald A. Westenskow and
Judgment is entered in favor of Donald A. Westenskow against defendant, Scott W. Holt, as
follows:
Returri.of withheld funds

513,500.00 (1/3 x 540,500.00 (30% x 5135,000))

Accrued pre-judgment interest
for 10/1/95 to 12/31/99

5,737.50 (10% per annum per UCA§ 15-1-1)

Costs:

Court
filing
5120.00
Service of process
12.00
Deposition of Scott Holt 135.00
267.00
JUDGMENT AMOUNT

519,504.50

5. Prejudgment interest shall continue for January 1, 2000 through the date of entry of
Judgment at 53.70 per day.
6. The judgment shall be augmented by costs of collection including reasonable attorney
fees, costs and post judgment interest.
DATED this X(t

day of January, 2000.
By the Court:

)MAS L. WILLMORE
:"^^^^^^/Di^trict Court Judge

S
^

V-^ 3 ^

ft-

A

W A H

Order
Loffredo v. Holt
Case No. 980100068

Certificate of Mailine
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the forgoing Order via
facsimile (801) 546-1420 and U.S. Mail to Scott W. Holt, 44 North iMain, Layton, Utah 84041,
on this £ H ^ day of January, 2000.

^~^J3^A
Paralegal

Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Rules if Judicial Administration, the original Order and
Judgment will be submitted to the Court after five (5) days if no objection is filed.

Order
Loffredo v. Holt

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
BONNIE LOFFREDO and DONALD
WESTENSKOW,
Plaintiffs,
vs
SCOTT W. HOLT,
Defendant-

|

HON. THOMAS L. WILLMORE

I

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No. 980100068 CN

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs' proposed Order and Judgment and defendant's
Objection to Judgment and Order. Oral argument was presented to the Court on October 20, 1999.
Having heard the argument of the parties and reviewing written memoranda filed by the parties, the
Court now issues this Memorandum Decision. The pertinent facts concerning the proposed Order and
Judgment and Objection thereto are as follows:

1. On June 29, 1999, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision granting in
part and denying in part plaintiffs' and defendant's Motions for Summary
Judgment. Specifically, the Court ruled that Westenskow did not sign a
contingent fee agreement and was not subject to its terms. It was ordered that
Westenskow would be liable to defendant for reasonable fees for services
rendered on his behalf and the remainder would be returned by defendant to
Westenskow.
2. The Court ordered defendant to submit an accounting of time and costs
expended on behalf of Westenskow within twenty days from the date of the
Memorandum Decision.
3. On August 19,1999, plaintiffs filed an Order and Judgment with the Court.
4. On September 2,1999, defendant filed an Objection to Judgment and Order.
5. Defendant did not file an accounting until October 18,1999.
The first issue before the Court is whether defendant should be allowed to claim attorney's
fees when he failed to comply with the Court's Order and submit an accounting within twenty days of
the Court's Memorandum Decision. The Memorandum Decision was issued on June 29, 1999. The
Memorandum Decision clearly informs the defendant to submit an accounting of time expended on
behalf of Westenskow within twenty days of the date of the Memorandum Decision. Therefore,
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Defendant did not file anything with the Court until September 2, 1999, when he filed an
Objection to the Judgment and Order. No accounting of defendant's time expended on behalf of
Westenskow was filed with the Objection on September 2nd. It was not until October 18, 1999 that
defendant filed an Affidavit of time incurred. Therefore, it was not until approximately three months
after its due date did defendant file an accounting with the Court.

At the oral argument on October 20, 1999, the defendant argued that he and plaintiffs'
counsel had been in negotiations concerning settlement of the judgment amount and that defendant had
made an offer to plaintiffs to settle the case. Defendant submits that he did not file an accounting
because it was his understanding that negotiations were ongoing.

Defendant's argument is unsupported by the facts. There is a letter dated July 13, 1999
from plaintiffs' counsel to defendant indicating that defendant's offer would be reviewed with his
clients, but there is nothing in the letter stating that an Order and Judgment would not be submitted to
the Court pending the negotiations. Defendant did not send a confirming letter to plaintiffs' counsel
about waiting to submit the Order while settlement negotiations continued. Neither did defendant file
a simple request with the Court for more time to submit an accounting. The continued failure of
defendant to follow-up with simple details is the very reason this case is again before the Court.

An examination of defendant's Affidavit of accounting clearly shows that it is "estimated
time." Also, plaintiffs' counsel has pointed the Court to defendant's answers to interrogatories numbers
6 and 8, dated February 26,1998 which were signed by the defendant and indicates that no time records
have been kept in the case. In order for defendant to be reimbursed for his time, he must submit to the
Court an accurate and reliable accounting of time incurred on behalf of defendant Westenskow. The
Court finds that defendant has failed to do so.

Therefore, defendant has failed to comply with the Court's Order in the Memorandum
Decision issued June 29,1999. Defendant did not file an accounting with the Court until approximately
three months after its due date. Since defendant's accounting is not timely filed, the Court will not
allow it and defcnrtant will nnt ?wwi//» o«,r „~~AU C~» ~H

J |
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The next issue before the Court is whether any specific findings of fact or conclusions of
law were required to be submitted in the Order and Judgment. In a letter to the Court dated October
29,1999, the defendant submits that specific findings of fact are not required in a Summary Judgment.
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial Court need not enter findings
of tact and conclusions of law in rulings on Motions.

The final issue raised by defendant Is whether statutory pre-judgment interest of 10 % is
applicable to plaintiffs' Judgment against defendant. Defendant submits that plaintiffs' right to prejudgment interest pursuant to UC A § 15-1-1 is applicable only to contracts. In the Court's June29,1999
Memorandum Decision, it ruled that defendant's attorney's fees were not proper pursuant to an
unsigned contingent fee agreement and that defendant should return the attorney's fees to Westenskow
subject to defendant's reasonable time worked on behalf of Westenskow. In other words, defendant
owed a sum certain from the date of settlement to Westenskow. The law is clear that Westenskow is
entitled to pre-judgment interest on this overdue debtfromthe date it should have been paid until entry
of Judgment. Fitzgerald v. Critchfield 744 P. 2d 301,304 (Utah App. 1987) The issue of pre-judgment
interest "is injected by law into every action for the payment of past due money." Lignell v. Berg, 593
P. 2d 800,801 (Utah 1979). Therefore, Westenskow is entitled to pre-judgment interest from the date
of the personal injury settlement to the date of Judgment.
Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare an Order in conformance with this Memorandum
Decision.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the j(r, f"*1 day of December, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, in the case of Loffredo/Westenskow vs. Holt,
case number 980100068 as follows:
R. Scott Waterfall
Catherine F. Labatte
Attorneys At Law
4605 Harrison Boulevard, 3rd Floor
Ogden, Utah 84403-7000

Scott W. Holt
44 North Main
Layton, Utah 84041

UT ST § 78-51-41, Compensation-Lien

Pagel

Utah Code § 78-51-41
UTAH CODE, 1953
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78, JUDICIAL CODE
PART VI. ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
CHAPTER 51. GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this
document.)
Current through End of 1999 General Sess.

§ 78-51-41. Compensation—Lien
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for services is governed by agreement, express or
implied, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an
answer containing a counterclaim or at the time that the attorney and client enter into a written or oral
employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has a lien upon the client's cause of action or
counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor
and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement
between the parties before or after judgment. Any written employment agreement shall contain a
statement that the attorney has a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim.
As last amended by Chapter 100, Laws of Utah 1989.

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART VI, ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
CHAPTER 5L GENERAL PROVISIONS
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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*1178 Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 1.5
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP
Current with amendments received through 11-1-1999

RULE 1.5 FEES
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered
as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, and it is reasonably foreseeable that total
attorneys fees to the client will exceed $750.00, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the
client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement
shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal,
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery and whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the
lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.
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RPC Rule 1.5, RULE 1.5 FEES

Page 2

*1179 (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect:
(1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the
securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement
with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) The client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all lawyers involved; and
(3) The total fee is reasonable.
[Amended effective September 1, 1995.]
Comment
Basis or Rate of Fee
When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding
concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as
to the fee should be promptly established in writing, where it is reasonably foreseeable that the fees will
exceed $750.00. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only
those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate
is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount or to identify the factors that may be taken
into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an
earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written
statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a
simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of
the fee is set forth.
Terms of Payment
A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee but is obligated to return any unearned portion. See
Rule 1.14(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an
enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money
may be subject to special scrutiny because it involves questions concerning both the value of the services
and the lawyer's special knowledge of the value of the property.
*1180 An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail
services for the client or perform them in any way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer
should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when
it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately
explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of
a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's
ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using
wasteful procedures. When there is doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's best
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interest, the lawyer should offer the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications.
Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage.
Division of Fee
A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in
the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which
neither alone could serve the client as well and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the
division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a
fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or by agreement between the participating
lawyers if all assume responsibility for the representation as a whole and the client is advised and does
not object. It does not require disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to receive. Joint
responsibility for the representation entails the obligations stated in Rule 5.1 for purposes of the matter
involved. Rule 1.5(e) is not intended to prevent the sale of a law practice (including goodwill) if the sale
otherwise complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Disputes Over Fees
If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation
procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may
prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or
administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee, as part of the measure of damages. The
lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should
comply with the prescribed procedure.
*1181 Code Comparison
The factors of a reasonable fee in Rule 1.5(a) are substantially identical to those listed in DR 2-106(B).
EC 2-17 states that a lawyer "should not charge more than a reasonable fee...."
There was no counterpart to paragraph (b) in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-19 stated that it
is "usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly
when it is contingent."
There was likewise no counterpart to paragraph (c) in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-20
provided: "Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United
States," but "a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis by one
who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee...."
With regard to paragraph (d), DR 2-106(C) prohibited "a contingent fee in a criminal case." EC 2-20
provided that "contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases are rarely justified."
With regard to paragraph (e), DR 2-107(A) permitted division of fees only if: "(1) The client consents
to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made. (2) The
division is in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each. (3) The total fee
does not exceed clearly reasonable compensation...." Paragraph (e) permits division without regard to
the services rendered by each lawyer if they assume joint responsibility for the representation.
[Amended effective November 1, 1998.]
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